We consider software written for networked, wireless sensorn o d e s ,a n ds p e c i a l i z es o f t w a r ev e r i fi c a t i o nt e c h n i q u e sf o rs t a n d a r d Cp r o g r a m si no r d e rt ol o c a t ep r o g r a m m i n ge r r o r si ns e n s o ra p plications before the software's deployment on motes. Ensuring the reliability of sensor applications is challenging: low-level, interrupt-driven code runs without memory protection in dynamic environments. The difficulties lie with (i) being able to automatically extract standard C models out of the particular flavours of embedded C used in sensor programming solutions, and (ii) decreasing the resulting program's state space to a degree thatallo ws practical verification times.
Introduction
While small applications for basic embedded systems for a particular microcontroller can be programmed directly in machine code, sensor node platforms are typically equipped with a rather rich set of features, including a radio (and in many cases, also a wired serial) transceiver, sensing chips and externalflash memory. Programming from scratch each new application for such sensor platforms is difficult and unmaintainable-be this programming done in either assembly, or the platform's own flavour of embedded C. For example, a basic Oscilloscope functionality (i.e., a sensor node periodically sampling a sensor, then broadcasting a message over the radio every ten readings) in the elf32-avr binary form for the MicaZ mote 1 disassembles into over 12 × 10 3 lines of executable code in its .text section alone; similar program sizes are yielded from TelosB 2 MSP430 elf files. Programming embedded C instead (for the platforms' C compilers, e.g., avr-gcc and msp430-gcc (Underwood, 2003)) does not decrease the code's complexity-the Email addresses: doina.bucur@gmail.com (Doina Bucur), marta.kwiatkowska@comlab.ox.ac.uk (Marta Kwiatkowska) 1 Mica motes are based around the Atmel AVR ATmega128L 8-bit microcontroller (Corp., 2009) . 2 Telos platforms (e.g., TelosB (Moteiv Corporation, 2004) ) are built with MSP430 (Texas Instruments, 2006) , a 16-bit MCU from Texas Instruments. application will have roughly the same size 3 .
# 104 "/Users/doina/tinyos−2.x/tos/chips/msp430/McuSleepC.nc" __asm volatile ("bis %0, r2" : : "m"(temp)); __asm volatile ("" Instead of programming sensor applications from scratch, operating systems have been developed for sensor nodes, such as TinyOS and Contiki. As a result, typically programmers write application logic in a high-level language, while calling scheduling and driver functionality from the operating system. Fig. 1 overviews TinyOS's tool chain of program compilation for a TelosB mote. The Oscilloscope application is an e s C( G a ye ta l . ,2 0 0 3 )o rT O S T h r e a d s( K l u e se ta l . ,2 0 0 9 ) component interfacing with existing TinyOS components; the binary program deployable on a TelosB mote is generated by two discrete stages of program translations, from nesC to inlined MSP430 C, to MSP430 machine code.
With this multi-stage style of program compilation in mind, our task is to design software verification methods and tools for sensor applications. In this paper, we focus on taking as input platform-specific embedded C, such as that automatically generated from higher-level software components in the chain of compilation from Fig. 1 . While we take our case studies from the standard TinyOS applications, the verification method itself is OS-independent.
Software verification per se is a compile-time method which, given a particular program implementation and set of specifications, unwinds and analyses all of the program's traces, and outputs violations of the program's specifications, if any. Specific such tools cater for specific programming (and specification) languages, and most are limited as to the program features they support, e.g.:
1. complex data structures are supported by few existing software verifiers, 2. infinite-state programs cannot in general be guaranteed that verification terminates, 3. even finite-state programs, particularly concurrent ones,
give rise to sets of program states which are too large to be verified within certain time limits.
In what follows, we describe our platform-dependent, OS-independent software verification tool for OS-wide programs (on the order of magnitude of 10 3 LOC) written for msp430-gcc with asynchronous hardware interrupts. Our tool automatically translates such a program into standard C by modelling direct memory access and the MCU's memory map in ANSI-C. Calls to hardware interrupt handlers are inserted into the main application to emulate the existence of hardware interrupts, and the number of their occurrences is minimized with a partial-order reduction technique, in order to decrease the program's state space, while fully preserving program semantics. Safety specifications are written as C assertions embedded in the code. The resulting sequential program is then passed to CBMC (Clarke et al., 2004) , a bounded software verifier for sequential ANSI C. Besides memory-related errors (e.g., out-of-bounds arrays, null-pointer dereferences), the tool chain verifies application-specific assertions, including low-level assertions upon the state of the registers and peripherals.
We first give background information essential to our approach in Section 2. This includes the syntax and semantics of MSP430 embedded C, an overview of (i) the MSP430 microcontroller, (ii) the TelosB platform, and (iii) CBMC, the software verifier for ANSI C that we specialize for our purpose.
Background: Platform and embedded language for sensor nodes. CBMC
Av a r i e t yo fh a r d w a r ep l a t f o r m sa r ea v a i l a b l ea ss e n s o r nodes. TelosB motes (Moteiv Corporation, 2004) are based on the 16-bit Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller (Texas Instruments, 2006) ; Mica nodes are built around Atmel's AV R ( C o r p . , 2 0 0 9 ) , a n d M I Te s n o d e s a r o u n d I n t e l 's 8 0 5 1 ( A tmel, 2008).
MSP430, TelosB and msp430-gcc
We consider MSP430, a microcontroller configuration featuring, on a I 2 Cb us,a16-bitRISCCPU,48kBFlashmemory (and 10kB RAM), 16-bit registers, two built-in 16-bit timers, a 12-bit analogue-to-digital converter, two universal serial synchronous/asynchronous communication interfaces (USART), and 64 I/Op i n s( t h el a t t e r ,t o g e t h e rw i t ht h e i rc o n n e c t i o n so n aT elosBmote,overviewedinFig.2). Apin' sidentifieristhree-fold;pin17,fore xample,ispin5 of peripheral port 1 (out of six 8-bit I/Oports),andisageneralpurpose digital I/Op i no raT i m e rAo u t p u tp i n ,f r o mt h em icrocontroller's perspective; on TelosB specifically, this pin is connected to the bidirectional serial data port, HUM SDA, of the TelosB on-board humidity sensor (which produces a digital output). Similarly, pins 32-33 are transmit/receive pins for the first serial port, USART0, and are connected as such to the serial physical port on TelosB. Pins 48-50, or 4 to 6 on peripheral port 5 (general-purpose digital I/Op i n s ,o rc l o c ko u t p u t s )a r e instead connected to, and control, the three on-board LEDs.
The software is able to access these pins, together with other peripheral modules and registers, by direct memory access. All on-board memory, including peripherals and the Interrupt Vector Table, are mapped into a unique address space, with Special Function Registers and peripheral modules at low addresses,as in Fig. 3 . The MCU's six 8-bit I/OportswhosepinsareshowninFig.2 are mapped onto the 0x10-0xFF address space for 8-bit peripheral modules. E.g., the 8-bit output register for port 5 is accessed as 0x0031;bits4-6inthisre gistercontroltheLEDs. Thus, when a msp430-gcc (Underwood, 2003) embedded C program states:
static volatile uint8_t r __asm ("0x0031"); r &=~(1 << 6); or in other words *(volatile uint8_t *)49U |=~(1 << 6); this amounts to setting a bit in the 8-bit output register P5OUT of peripheral port 5 at location 0x0031,whereLEDsareaccessed, which turns the yellow LED on. Other essential memory mapping examples are shown in Table 1 . Similarly, when a function such as sig ADC VECTOR is declared with the attributes __attribute((wakeup)) __attribute ((interrupt(14) )) the function is an interrupt handler for interrupt line 14 (i.e., it wakes the processor from any low power state as the routine exits).
TinyOS
TinyOS ) is a mainstream operating system for wireless sensor network devices. We give an overview of TinyOS in order to clarify (i) program structure and (ii) terminology related to the style of concurrency, for our case study applications.
The operating systems itself, as well as the applications, are implemented in the nesC (network embedded systems C) language (Gay et al., 2003) ; newer applications are coded in TOSThreads (Klues et al., 2009 ), TinyOS 2.x's recent thread library. NesC software comes in components,eithermodules or configurations.F i g .4g i v e sa no v e r v i e wo fOscilloscope,atypical TinyOS nesC application; the LED driver module LedsC is given a degree of detail. Components have similarities to objects: they enclose the program's state and interact through interfaces . For efficiency, given the language's focus on embedded systems, an application's components, interfaces and memory use are determined at compile-time; there is no dynamic memory allocation. All lengthy commands in TinyOS (e.g., the sending of a packet on the radio) are non-blocking; their completion is signalled by an event (some of which are triggered by a hardware interrupt), whose handler should be brief, instead posting tasks to the system's task queue for further execution. All threads of control in a TinyOS application are thus rooted in either an event handler or a task, in a two-level concurrency model: event handlers run with highest priority and preempt the lowerpriority tasks, which execute most of the program logic. Tasks run to completion, however, and synchronous code is that which is only reachable from tasks; asynchronous code is reachable from at least one event handler. Whenever program variables are accessible to both synchronous and asynchronous code, a potential data race ensues.
For a particular application, nesC components are wired together through their interfaces to form an OS-wide program; nesC is in fact designed under the expectation that a final, inlined embedded C program will be generated from all the necessary components.
CBMC
CBMC (Clarke et al., 2004 ) is a bounded modelchecker (Clarke et al., 2001) for ANSI-C programs, from the CProver suite. It takes safety specifications written as C assert statements, and is roughly geared towards verifying embedded systems software. Unlike other C model checkers, CBMC supports a richer subset of the language in what regards data types and data representation, by modelling semantics accurately to the bit level, to the extent that this semantics is defined by the ANSI C standard 4 .T h i sa l l o w st h et o o l st o pinpoint program errors related to bit-level operators and arithmetic overflow, pointer and array operations, arithmetic exceptions, user-inserted assertions and assumptions.
To derive an accurate mathematical representation of a (potentially infinite-state) input program, the tool translates the C input into a side-effect-free, finite-state intermediate representation:
1. All side-effect assignments are broken into equivalent statements by introducing auxiliary variables, and all loops (for, while,b a c k w a r dgotos) are unwound au s e rprovided number of times, by replicating the loop body. 2. Function calls are inlined and recursive calls are similarly unwound.
The resulting program consists of if instructions, assignments, assertions, labels, and forward jumps. This is then translated into static single assignment form (SSA), a standard intermediate representation in which every program variable is split into "versions", i.e., a new program variable is invented foreach assignment to the original (Fig. 5, center) . Frequently usedfor compiler optimizations, the technique simplifies the analysis of the variables' definition and use. Two boolean propositional formulas are derived from this program in SSA form: C for the program itself, and P for the asserted expression, as in Fig. 5 , right. ANSI-C variables x i of any data type (including arrays, structures, unions, pointers,andall basic data types) are now replaced with bit-vector variables, and all mathematical operations performed over program variables with bit vector operations, by bit blasting (Kroening and Strichman, 2008 ). This transformation is word-width adjustable to, e.g., 16 bits, to simulate different hardware platforms. P is then verified by converting C ∧¬P into conjunctive normal form (CNF) and then passing it to a SAT solver such as MiniSAT (Sörensson and Eén, 2005) . If this conjuncted formula is satisfiable, there exists a violation of the assertion, and CBMC returns to the programmer a program trace leading to the violation, as a debugging tool would do; otherwise, the assertion holds.
In verifying an ANSI-C program by bounded unwinding, CBMC thus proves a partial guarantee of program properties (i.e., that bugs are absent for a certain amount of unwinding). The process is highly automated and scales reasonably well.
TOS2CProver: source-to-source transformation

Overview
Software bugs stem from flaws both in the legacy OS code base (the lowest levels of which are platform-dependent), and in the programmer's applications. By a safe sensor application, we understand that which exhibits no memory violations, and whose programmer-inserted assertions hold, if reachable. Note that a safe application may still contain undiscovered errors, either if they require a greater number of loop unwindings, or if no appropriate assertion was specified. However, our verification approach can detect errors deeper in the program, compared to static analysis.
To achieve a homogeneous verification scheme for both legacy and newly programmed TinyOS code, we contribute, also in (Bucur and Kwiatkowska, 2010) , an automated tool chain of program transformation and verification as depictedin Fig. 6 . In order for the tool to be independent of the OS-specific programming paradigm, an initial run of TinyOS's nescc compiler is used to generate an inlined, platform-specific, embedded C program out of nesC and TOSThreads components. Then, instead of employing the platform's own compiler to further build this into a binary deployable on a mote, the program is passed to our own tool, tos2cprover,whichperformsadual task:
• In a source-to-source transformation step, it gives a precise ANSI-C model to all low-level, hardware-managing language extensions, and instruments the code so as to emulate the hardware's functionality: whenever a register's value is filled in from the hardware, the program is augmented so as to provide such values.
• Then, tos2cprover reads the functions' attributes and determines which functions would be called as IRQ handlers in the event of a hardware interrupt, then instruments the resulting program so that IRQ handlers may be called whenever hardware interrupts are allowed; this way, the code also becomes a hardware emulator. A specialized partial-order reduction (POR) technique is used to minimize the number of occurrences of such calls. Following these transformation and instrumentation steps, the result is a standard C program which both soundly preserves the functionality of the initial platform-specific program, and emulates the hardware. The program is instrumented with user-inserted properties (in the form of assertions, assumptions and nondeterministic input), and passed to CBMC (which also introduces a set of assertions) for verification; the unwinding bounds for the program loops are set individually per loop.
In the remainder of this section, we briefly describe tos2cprover's source-transformation step. The instrumentation of the source with calls to IRQ handlers (and the accompanying partial-order reduction technique) are detailed inSection 4. Table 2 exemplifies the source transformations executed by tos2cprover on a TelosB, MSP430 program. While msp430-gcc code implicitly assumes an underlying memory map (as overviewed in Section 2) in which low, constant addresses have a defined semantics (e.g., writing at 0x0031 programs the LEDs), tos2cprover models direct memory access with a header file defining memory as a set of new, global variables. E.g., uint8 t P5OUT is now the 8-bit output register for peripheral port 5. All subsequent dereferences of address 0x0031 are replaced by accesses to P5OUT 5 .A san o t e ,t h e Status Register R2 has the General Interrupt Enable (GIE) as bit 4; if GIE is set, interrupts are enabled.
TOS2CProver: source-to-source transformation
Then, msp430-gcc's assembly extensions are modelled into standard C, as are all other non-standard language features (e.g., identifier names are standardized by replacing dollar signs with underscores, struct and union designated initializers are expanded).
5 Note that the variables we introduce are named in accordance with the MSP430 documentation (Texas Instruments, 2006) , but are preceded by an underscore, to avoid name clashes with existing program variables.
TOS2CProver: IRQ instrumentation and the partialorder reduction (POR) technique
Overview
The nescc-generated program inputted to tos2cprover does not explicitly call any IRQ handlers; in deployments, the calls are made from the hardware. Instead, it defines the functions and marks them as interrupt service routines; e.g., in the case of a TelosB-based Sense,twotypesofhardwareinterrupts are expected: one from the user timer, TimerB, and another from the 12-bit Analog-to-Digital Converter, ADC. Their handler functions have the signatures:
The size of the asynchronous code (i.e., code reachable from either IRQ handler) is substantial: in Sense,o u to ft h e5 2 0 reachable functions in the program, 166 are reachable from the ADC interrupt handler and 185 from the TIMERB0 handler (i.e., are asynchronous); 386 (both synchronous and asynchronous functions) are reachable from main 6 . To simulate the presence of interrupts, tos2cprover needs to instrument the program with explicit, atomic calls to the handlers of the expected hardware interrupts, e.g., sig_ADC_VECTOR(),witheachcallguardedbyacheckofthe GIE bit, and each call made atomic by disabling and enabling interrupts (as TinyOS events always run to completion). A listing is given in Table 3 .
Ac o r r e c t ,y e tn a i v e ,a p p r o a c hi st oi n s t r u m e n tt h ep r o g r a m by refactoring it to use threads, and running the IRQ instrumentation (such as that listed in Table 3 ) as separate threads alongside a main thread, as in Fig. 7(a) . The equivalent sequential alternative is to add an instrumentation as every second statement in all non-atomic main-reachable code. Since each instrumented IRQ call amounts, at model-checking time, to the 
Fixed-address dereference
Global variable access *(uint8_t*)49U &=~(0x01 << 6);
_P5OUT &=~(0x01 << 6);
Fixedly allocated variables Global variable access uint16_t HplAdc12P$ADC12CTL0 __asm ("0x01A0"); (declaration removed; ADC12CTL0 previously declared) HplAdc12P$ADC12CTL0 |= 0x0010; _ADC12CTL0 |= 0x0010;
Assembly instructions C instructions __asm volatile ("eint"); _R2 &= 0x0008; __asm volatile ("bis %0, r2": :"m"(temp)); _R2 |= temp; 
Decreasing the state space with a partial-order reduction technique
The first state-space minimization procedure is a partial order reduction (POR) technique (or model checking using representatives) (Clarkeetal.,2000) ,ageneralmethodtoreducethe state space of a concurrent program to be model checked. Applied to the original embedded C code, it calculates a smallerC program for CBMC to verify; the technique reduces the number of interleavings between threads of behaviour by exploitingthe fact that a number of different interleavings are equivalent and indistinguishable to the model checking algorithm, and thusi t suffices to check a single interleaving representative. An image of the transformation of the program as a result of the POR technique is given in Fig. 7(b) .
To achieve this, we take the concurrent C program refactoring as in Fig. 7 (a) and give it a standard formalization, over which we then apply a specialized POR algorithm, as follows.
System formalization. We define by state s ∈ S av aluationof all program variables before or after a C statement 7 or an explicitly atomic section. Then, we define the transition set T to contain state tuples, T ⊆ S × S ;wewriteα ∈ T or s α → s for a single transition; a path π is a sequence of transitions. Transitions intuitively model C statements (including assertions), atomic sections, and the program's control flow: when executed from a state s,atransitionα leads the program into a new state s .A sa ne x a m p l eo ft h i sf o r m a l i z a t i o n ,t h es i m p l i fi e d , inlined fragment of Sense from Fig. 8 (refactored with a concurrent ADC interrupt handler as in Fig. 7(a) ) is formalized in Fig. 9 (left) .
At r a n s i t i o nα from T is called enabled in state s if ∃s ∈ S .s −→ s ,w i t ht h es e to ft r a n s i t i o n se n a b l e di ns denoted by enabled(s). E.g., enabled(s 0 ) = {α 1 ,β} in Fig. 9 (left) . Then, the Kripke structure equivalent to the concurrent program is M = (S , T, {s 0 }), with s 0 the unique initial state of the program. This we call the full-state graph,asT models all possible interleavings between the program's threads.
As usual, our POR technique aims at constructing from the full-state transition relation T as e c o n d ,s m a l l e rs u c hr e l a t i o n 
ample(s) ⊆ enabled(s)
This reduced set of transitions should satisfy a soundness condition: when ample(s)r e p l a c e senabled(s), the soundness of the model checking algorithm must be preserved.
Calculating the ample set. The basis for soundly calculating ample(s)r e l i e so na nindependence relation between transitions (Clarke et al., 2000) . This independence relation I ⊆ T ×T is a symmetric relation satisfying, for any s ∈ S and for any (α, β) ∈ I,twoconditions:
Enabledness The two transitions may execute in either order from any state s.I . e . , i f α, β ∈ enabled(s), then
Commutativity Executing either of the two possible transition sequences starting in any state s leads to the same end state. I.e, if α, β ∈ enabled(s), then α(β(s)) = β(α(s)).
The dependency relation D is the complement of I;twotransitions which are not independent are then dependent. With these definitions, the sound reduction from enabled(s) to ample(s)m u s ts a t i s f yt h ec o n s t r a i n t su p o nample(s)( b a s e d on (Clarke et al., 2000) ) listed in Table 4 . 
C 1 Along every path of the full-state graph starting in s,a transition dependent on a transition α from ample(s) must be preceded by α.T h i se ffectively allows the deferring of transitions.
We then apply the constraints in Table 4 to the reduction of the sample program in Fig. 9 (left) . To start with, we note, from the listing in Fig. 8 by applying the definition of independence above, that α 0 , α 2 and α 3 are independent from β;e . g . , executing either α 0 β or βα 0 from any initial variable valuation leads to the same end values for variables state, next,e t c . Intuitively, the independent pairs of transitions are thosewhich cannot cause data races. α 1 and β are dependent, with a data race over next.
Take initial program state s ini with enabled(s ini ) = {α 0 ,β}.By In More intuitively, tos2cprover instruments the main program with the following reduced set of IRQ calls:
• Acallfor ,e. g. ,sig_ADC_VECTOR() appears before each statement containing a read of a variable raced between the ADC interrupt and main.T h i si ss o u n d ,b u to v e r a p p r o x imated: the statement may execute in an atomic context, in which case the call is not reachable.
• Acallalsoappears(i)beforethebeginningofthoseatomic sections where a data race may happen, or (ii) in the MCU's interruptible sleep.
This first POR-based minimization step results in, e.g., in the case of Sense,atotalnumberof91IRQcallsbetweenthetw o types of IRQs, as opposed to a number two orders of magnitude higher in a naive refactoring (i.e., Fig. 7 (a) ).
Improving POR's overapproximated race criterion by
reachability checks Afi n a la n a l y s i ss t e pi su s e dt of u r t h e rm i n i m i z et h ei n s t r umentation count described in Section 4. To remove some of the degree of overapproximation in assessing the atomicity of code, tos2cprover inputs the instrumented program to CBMC for a preliminary run which checks the reachability of each IRQ instrumentation: the verification of a claim of the form assert(0); inserted in the body of the interrupt routine will fail when the assertion is reachable.
This step leaves, e.g., Sense with a manageable set of 8 reachable IRQ calls. This CBMC run is inexpensive, with verification times per claim in the range of 8 to 78 seconds. This orderof-magnitude reduction is due to tos2cprover having thus far overapproximated the race criterion-many of the IRQ instrumentations prove to be unreachable within a bounded check, e.g., in situations when they run at program points when interrupts are disabled, or when the code is explicitly atomic.
Assertions, nondeterminism and assumptions. Unwinding bounds for CBMC
This section describes the instrumentation of the program with assertions, assumptions and nondeterminism, and the setting of bounds for program unwinding by CBMC.
Assertions, nondeterminism and assumptions
Our tool chain verifies, for each inputted program, two types of assertions. For both existing TinyOS code base and any new applications, assertions may be manually inserted by the programmer and are preserved as such in the transformed program source. These application-based assertions can be either hardware-aware, e.g.
assert(_P5OUT & 0x0008);
or high-level, (e.g., asserting upon the value of a local variable).
Furthermore, CBMC automatically inserts memoryviolation assertions guarding both bounds of all array accesses, null-pointer dereferences, and other exceptions such as arithmetic division by zero.
E.g., as function SchedulerBasicP pushTask(uint8 ti d )writes upon the task queue:
with id unsigned, CBMC will generate the upper-bound assertion:
array 'SchedulerBasicP_m_next' upper bound (unsigned int)SchedulerBasicP_m_tail < 8
For Sense,1 3 2m e m o r y -v i o l a t i o na s s e r t i o n sa r et h u sg e n e rated 8 .Adv antageously ,thisgenerationiscompletelyautomatic, with CBMC analysing an array's declaration to find the index bounds; SafeTinyOS (Cooprider et al., 2007) , for example, has programmers explicitly type-annotate arrays with access bounds instead.
Finally, a decision needs to be taken with regard to the contents of those registers and buffers whose values are filled in by the hardware and not the software. For example, reading the current time in a TelosB application takes the form of reading the user timer's count register, TBR (mapped at address 0x0190), which holds the number of clock periods elapsed since the last timer interrupt, and which is automatically incremented from the hardware at every clock period. In another example, the 8-bit U0RXBUF buffer (mapped at 0x0076)holds the latest byte received from the network. A similar discussion holds for setting TOS_NODE_ID,t h ev a r i a b l ew h i c hh o l d st h e node's address, and which is programmed at deployment time.
Clearly, the actual values in such registers drive the program's further behaviour. We set their values in either of two ways:
• The register involved is assigned a nondeterministic (i.e., any)v alue,andtheverificationprocedureexploresallthe ensuing possibilities.
• The register is assumed to have a particular value, or to have any value within a small, specified set.
Unwinding bounds for CBMC
As a final step in our tool chain, the transformed program annotated with assertions is passed to CBMC (configured for 16-bit words), and each claim is verified one at a time, for scalability. The runs need to have an unwinding depth specified; this can be either identical for all loops and recursions, orideally-selectively refined for each. Some of the loops are obviously of fixed iterations; e.g., out of only 16 loops in Sense, the loop:
is always bounded at 16 iterations (the size of the ADC12 conversion memory) 9 .O t h e rl o o p s ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,a r ec l e a r l y unbounded, such as the main OS scheduler loop in function SchedulerBasicP Scheduler taskLoop.F o r o u r b e n c hmarks, in the following, we make a visual inspection of the program's loops (as reported by CBMC), determine bounds for the loops which are clearly bounded, and experiment with unwinding depth for the rest. For the purpose of determining the reachability of instrumented IRQ calls (described in Section 4), we set the depth for the unbounded loops to the minimum, 1.
Verification and results
For our tests, we settle on the existing applications in the apps directory from TinyOS's source tree; we pick applications which wire TelosB components of different functionality, as summarized in Table 5 .
We detail the size and complexity of the test cases in terms of (i) the number of lines of code in the cleanly reformatted program outputted by tos2cprover,( i i )t h en u m b e ro f unique loops for which CBMC needs to have configured an unwinding depth, (iii) the number and type of expected hardware interrupts, together with qualitative measures of the size of the code duplication incurred during the IRQ instrumentation phase, such as the count of asynchronous functions, and that of ensuing data races. As a side note, the program generated by nescc and inputted to tos2cprover is not fully optimized; for our test cases, this input program contained code of no end functionality, such as that rooted in the IRQ handlers for the non-user timer, TIMERA0/1; tos2cprover skips instrumenting the program with such IRQ calls. On another hand, for TestDissemination we preserved the code for the UART0RX/TX interrupts, and instrumented the program with the respective calls: UART functionality may not be wired through to the top application component, but supports the CC2420 radio.
Finally, Table 5 gives the number of IRQ instrumentations calculated as in Section 4, and the number of automatically generated, memory-violation assertions; most of the assertions are array bounds checks, with a number of null-pointer dereference checks.
In the remainder of this section, we give an overview of our verification runs, and discuss the tool's scalability.
Out-of-bounds array access, null-pointer dereference, and application-based assertions
We ran our MSP430 test cases through the verification tool chain, having set to any value the contents of the TimerB count register TBR,t h e1 6A D C 1 2s e n s o rm e m o r y buffers ADC12MEM[],a n dt h et r a n s m i ta n dr e c e i v eb u ffers U0TXBUF/ U0RXBUF.
Any verification run is parameterized by the following measures:
• The number of IRQ calls added per iteration of the scheduler main loop. While tos2cprover calculates the program points at which an IRQ of a certain type can be called, a verification run may include all, none, or any superset of these calls. This is settled empirically on a perapplication basis: one TIMERB0 interrupt is sufficient to explore the workings of Blink,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rADC and Sense;foranynetworkcommunication,ontheotherhand, an interrupt arrives for any byte received, which induced us to allow more UART0 transmit or receive interrupts per loop.
• The unwinding bound for the infinitely looping SchedulerBasicP Scheduler taskLoop function. Given some understanding of the task loop functionality, and the number of IRQ calls per loop, we again settle the number empirically, per-application.
• The number of assertions checked in one verification run; this number can be either one (and CBMC is configured with the assertion's identifier) or all;a sc h e c k i n go n ea ssertion at a time scales better, we automated our tool to iterate through all of the program's assertions.
All our verification runs of the memory violations in the test cases from Table 5 came up negative, when allowed two task loops and one IRQ per loop (in the case of Blink and Sense) and up to eight loops and eight IRQs per loop for TestDissemination.W et h e na r t i fi c i a l l yt r i g g e r e dp o s i t i v er u n si nTestDissemination,i . e . ,w es e n tan u l lp o i n t e rt oarequestData call in the DisseminationEngineImplP module from TinyOS's network library (the comments are ours):
DisseminationEngineImplP_sendObject(uint16_t key) { the assertion then generated by CBMC to check the sanity of the pointer:
line 7503 function DisseminatorP_0_DisseminationCache_requestData dereference failure: NULL pointer !(SAME-OBJECT(size, NULL)) fails.
Constant-address dereference
Apotential,secondarysourceoferrorsinembeddedsoftware is that of dereferencing constant memory addresses. While null pointers may still be erroneous (as exemplified by Section 6.1), dereferencing constant, low pointers is generally expectedfrom embedded code. To enforce a degree of safety when dereferencing constants is involved, we state that all dereferencing of constants must be limited to constants from those memory-map sections which pertain to peripheral control (I/Olocations),and not to other sections.
To this end, in the process of program transformation, tos2cprover reports to the programmer the list of encountered memory dereferences, and translates the constant address implicated to its section in the memory map, e.g., for the line: and for a fixedly allocated variable:
static volatile uint8_t r __asm ("0x0019"); r |= 1 << 1;
we report -> DEREF at 25/0x19 in the 8-bit Peripheral Module with fixed-address variable r
In some cases (particularly for dereferences of address 0x0), an inspection of this report is advisable to sort any null pointers from legitimate peripheral access. A similar approach is taken by SafeTinyOS (Cooprider et al., 2007) , which has programmers explicitly mark legal dereferences of constants with a trusted type,andthusmakenull-pointerdereferencesvisible.
Cost of verification
The cost of showing that a TinyOS application is safe lies partially in (i) inspecting the program's loops to settle on an unwinding bound for each, (ii) inspecting the list of expected hardware interrupts to decide on the number of IRQ instrumentations necessary, and (iii) inspecting the report on dereferencing constant addresses. Mostly, however, the cost lies with the verification time: the time it takes the model checker to unwind the program (i.e., the program unwinding time), generate and simplify its boolean formula, and have this verified by the SAT solver (i.e., the decision procedure runtime). Fig. 10 exemplifies the verification times for a representative subset of memory-violation assertions from Sense. The x axis is labeled with identifiers of assertions: e.g., SchedulerBasicP pushTask.1 is the first assertion within the body of function SchedulerBasicP pushTask (i.e., in the original nesC code, function pushTask from component SchedulerBasicP). When more than two assertions are generated for a single function, we note that verification times are similar for all these assertions, and only depict the first andthe last. Two verification runs are given for each assertion (each run in terms of both program unwinding time and of decision procedure runtime); both runs are configured with one IRQ call per scheduler main loop; the first run unwinds the loop once, and the second twice.
The CBMC runs are configured for 16-bit words, without making use of CBMC's unwinding assertions feature, and with unwinding bounds set per loop (as described in Section 5.2, one higher than the number of loop iterations, e.g., written as a list of loop number:loop bound:
--unwindset 0:9,1:2,2:2,3:2,4: 9,6:1,7:17,8:17,9:9,[..] To give an idea of the complexity of the boolean program formula, for, e.g., the verification of claim SchedulerBasicP_popTask.1 (an assertion over array SchedulerBasicP_m_next's upper bound), the program formula has 80786 assignments, and a set of 18 independent verification conditions (i.e. logical formulae) are generated by CBMC from the C program with annotated assertions. Table 6 gives a fragment of such a verification condition for the function where the above claim resides; on the left is the originalC code for the function; on the right is the relevant successionof assignments of bit vectors in CBMC's program translation into verification conditions. Both listings end with giving the final claim, in C and boolean form, respectively.
When solving the overall program formula after bit blasting, the conjunctive normal form is a 357610-variable, 1058725-clause formula.
We note that most assertions are verified in a speedy manner, using close to zero time in the decision procedure, and a constant time for program unwinding. There are, however, notable exceptions for which the verification time explodes-we used these time-consuming runs to bound CBMC's unwinding depth: for, e.g., TestDissemination,s o m efi v e -s c h e d u l e r -l o o p s verification runs took up to 55 minutes. Such costly verification runs are generally expected for OS-wide networked applications, due to the large state space added to the program by the network communication drivers. :r e t u r n _ v a l u e _ S c h e d u l e r B a s i c P _ p o p T a s k $ 2 @ 2 # 3 ) [..] --!\guard#4 && !\guard#8 && !\guard#10 => (unsigned int)SchedulerBasicP_m_head#11 < 8
Related Work
Runtime safety
Most existing solutions to detect software errors in sensor operating systems act at runtime,are(unlikeourmethod)strictly OS-dependent and platform-independent, and are intended to be used for deployed applications: the code is instrumented such that a statement which is semantically unsafe under its current execution context is detected before it is executed,an d acertaindiagnosisorrecoverymeasureistaken(whichusually consists in reporting the error and rebooting, as summarizedin Table 7 ). While a necessary solution to ensure safe execution in all execution contexts, runtime error detection for deployments is potentially followed by the expensive redeployment of software, and could instead be preceded by compile-time means of error detection to save on redeployment efforts.
Safe TinyOS (Cooprider et al., 2007) detects memory and type violations in deployed TinyOS code, and transfers control to a fault handler, which either reboots or powers down after sending a concise failure report to its base station. The failure report identifies the error type and its source code location (but does not give an execution trace clarifying the context which caused the error); the failure report is used to debug the code post-deployment. While the method allows the safe execution of existing TinyOS code, with little programmer effort and runtime overhead, debugging every error encountered involves the software's redeployment.
Ad r a w b a c ko fS a f eT i n y O S ' sD e p u t yc o d ei n s t r u m e n t e ri s the fact that, unlike our automatic instrumentation with assertions, SafeTinyOS programmers must explicitly type-annotate e.g., a void *payload array with access bounds COUNT(len). The resulting program is first translated into C by the nesC compiler, and then into a program instrumented with, e.g., callstoa failure routine if(i >= len) deputy_fail().S t a t e m e n t s accessing a fixed address such as 0x0031 also need manual trusted cast annotations, TC().L i k eS a f e T i n y O St h o u g h( a n d unlike earlier SafeTinyOS versions), we do not change the C data representation in the verification process.
Neutron (Chen et al., 2009 ) adds a welcome update to Safe TinyOS, for applications coded in TinyOS's TOSThreads API: instead of rebooting the node as a corrective measure to a memory violation, Neutron groups the application's threads into recovery groups, and selectively restarts the threads in certain recovery units. Furthermore, it allows the preservation of the values held in "precious" memory locations between thread restarts.
The interface contracts write specification-like type annotations which define the "correct" use of TinyOS 1.x nesC interfaces, just as Safe TinyOS annotates memory for safe use. In cases when the semantics of the interface dictates it being stateful, the contract is expressed in terms of the state of the interface: for the interface command Timer.start(),t h ec o n t r a c ts t a t e sa sp r e c o n d i t i o nt h ef a c t that the timer's state must be IDLE,andasapostconditionthat the state of the timer changes (i.e., to ONE SHOT)i ft h ec o mmand's return value is SUCCESS.Inothercases,theinterfaceis stateless and the pre-and postconditions are imposed upon the command's arguments, which can themselves become stateful. This detects incorrect ordering of interface commands at runtime, e.g., a SendMsg.send() with a message buffer for which no SendMsg.sendDone() event was received to complete a previous send. On a related note, similar, stateful interface contracts are set over nesC commands and events in (Menrad et al., 2009) ; noting that state transitions, as programmed for interface contracts, can become lengthy, it devises an equivalent, more readable statechart notation, with the view towards a futureautomated (static) verification for all TinyOS interfaces.
NodeMD (Krunic et al., 2007) detects runtime errors in MantisOS multithreaded, synchronous code. AVR-based applications are instrumented to check the stack pointer SP for over- flows at function-call time, and for the violation of applicationspecific assertions. The checks for deadlock and livelock involve a manually added timer to verify that each thread goes through its duty cycle.
Hybrid approaches: runtime safety by emulation
An important hybrid approach between runtime and static error detection consists of combining runtime safety systems (such as Safe TinyOS) with cycle-accurate hardware emulators such as Avrora (Titzer et al., 2005) , MSPsim (Eriksson et al., 2007) , and WSim (Fraboulet et al., 2007) . A hardware emulator precisely simulates a platform in terms of its running assembly instructions; beside analyses of power and memory consumption, a precise timing analysis is also possible, given appropriate timing attached to the instructions. An overview of the current hardware support of emulators for sensor nodes is given in Table 8 .
While this combination does not provide full error traces the way a model-checking technique would, it does report the call stack at the point of the error, the way Safe TinyOS would; thus, real-time safety does not necessarily need to act at deploymenttime.
Verification and simulation
A weak form of static error detection is simulation. While it does not prove any guarantee on the program's behaviour, testing allows for error detection and is particularly realistic in the case of e.g., TOSSIM , which accurately (yet not cycle-accurately) simulates TinyOS applications from their implementation.
TinyOS's nesC compiler has a basic built-in data-race detector, which warns when a global variable is updated from non-atomic asynchronous code without having been explicitly tagged with norace. While writing atomic asynchronous code is good practice for nesC, failure to do so only potentially causes a race, as programmers may have used other syncronization idioms (i.e., guards on variables). A suitable context model for race checking (Henzinger et al., 2004) then contributed an algorithm for the elimination of such false positives.
Ad e g r e eo fc o m p i l e -t i m ev e r i fi c a t i o ni sr e p o r t e db yB ucur and Kwiatkowska (2009). While its scope is limited to TOSThreads applications written in C, it avoids some of the costs of system-wide verification by writing models for the interfaces to system calls (in the style of the runtime interface contracts Archer et al. (2007) ). Calling amRadioReceive(&msg, ...) from the application is modelled so that it preserves its original behaviour: the call returns any of a set of error codes, and msg receives (possibly nondeterministic) data. Then, the method calls the SA model checker for multithreaded C programs to verify the programmer's application on its own; the errors verified pertain to interface use, or are application-specific.
SMT solvers are used as backends to ANSI-C model checkers, instead of SAT solvers in (Cordeiro et al., 2009a (Cordeiro et al., ,b, 2010 , to verify bounded instances of ANSI-C programs, such as those generated by BMC frontends. Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers employ decision procedures which check the satisfiability of a quantifier-free formula in a first-order logic. To make SMT-based bounded model checkers applicable to checking realistic C, (Cordeiro et al., 2009b) provides translations from ANSI-C programs to SMT formulas as precisely as bit-accurate SAT-based procedures, and positively compares the performance of their model checker to that of CBMC and a previous SMT-based CMBC. New encodings are provided into existing SMT theories from ANSI-C scalar data types (with accurate arithmetic overflow and underflow), arrays and pointers, structures and unions; the test cases include array-heavy ANSICb e n c h m a r k ss u c ha ss o r t i n ga l g o r i t h m sa n dL i n u xd e v i c econtrolling applications. (Cordeiro et al., 2010 ) adds a statespace-reducing technique for the same verification method; this looks at the modifications undergone by the system since its last verification, and submits them to a partly static, partly dynamic "continuous" verification process, guided by a set of test cases for coverage.
Closer to our domain of sensor software, (Cordeiro et al., 2009a) gives a single case study of a verification approach to part of a platform-specific embedded C monitoring software. This approach splits the 3500-LOC monitoring application, written as a set of modules, into platform-dependent and platform-independent modules; like our method, all platformdependent syntax is translated to standard C. The method then statically verifies platform-dependent modules, one by one,using the co-verification feature of CBMC, together with a Verilog model of the microcontroller and against the standard CProver-inserted assertions to check the sanity of the interaction between software and hardware. A system-wide checking procedure is simulated on a hardware emulator. The method's advantages mostly lie in its ability to make good use of CBMC's hardware co-verification; its disadvantages lie in the amount of manual input needed to decide between the different verification schemes for different software modules, and in its potential Recent contributions. Other verification or high-coverage validation methods tackle the more difficult problem of static debugging for sensor network protocols. KleeNet (Sasnauskas et al., 2010 ) is a recent debugging environment for the high-coverage testing of networked sensor applications (case studied for Contiki OS), with the aim of discovering bugs that result from node interaction (by writing distributed assertions about the state of the network) and nondeterministic network events (such as loss, duplication and corruption of packets, or node failures). The latter aspects are especially difficult to observe in traditional testing mechanisms, or require manual effort by the developers to generate them.
The base technique for KleeNet's testing is the exploration of program paths in the virtual machine KLEE (Sasnauskas et al., 2010) : a distributed program is simulated in standard fashion until data flagged as 'symbolic' is reached (e.g., the contents of a network packet; this may be set to a nondeterministic value); at these points, the execution is branched (in the fashion of explicit-state model checking, with nodes forked on demand) and resumed for each such branch. This technique is then extended by KleeNet with failure models for both nodes and network communication, and assertions are written in distrbuted fashion, e.g., for a node A which just adds node B as a parentID in its routing table, the assertion:
if (parentID != NULL) { assert(NODE(parentID, ''isChild'', myID)); } states that B should also have A registered as a child. parentID and myID are variables local to A,whileisChild is a function called on B.
KleeNet itself is platform-independent, but each sensor network OS requires a frontend to KLEE. It was able to discover four bugs in Contiki's TCP/IP stack, one of which deadlocked anetworknode.
On a similar note to KleeNet, T-Check (Li and Regehr, 2010) uses random walks and execution-driven, depth-bounded explicit-state model checking.I tb u i l d so nt h eT O S S I M( L e v i s et al., 2003) simulator for TinyOS, and inherits its emulation of hardware at the TinyOS interface, rather than at the hardware register level; this precludes safety specifications related to, e.g., register contents, timing or interrupt preemption, but gains scalability. T-Check does, however, report that it "found TOSSIM to be too high-level to support effective bug-finding", which led to its "extending the ADC, serial, and SPI subsystems to model more low-level behavior", i.e. modelling the relevant interrupts, as in our work. Network and node nondeterminism is introduced, together with a TinyOS-specific nondeterminism related to event ordering. Their model checking is a stateless, depth-bounded, depth-first search with a partial order reduction based on the static presumption that a pair of transitions on different sensor nodes is independent unless the events are am a t c h e ds e n d /receive pair. Both safety and liveness properties are checked against, the latter heuristically, by looking for sufficiently long program traces violating the property; a number of bugs are found in the TinyOS serial driver and some tree protocols.
Anquiro (Mottola et al., 2010 ) is a model-checking based verification tool for Contiki applications; as a plus over our tos2cprover-based tool, it allows for a software engineering solution to slice the application code up to a desired level, e.g., either including code interfacing to the hardware as in our method, or remodelling network communication, similar to (Bucur and Kwiatkowska, 2009) . LTL specifications are inputted to the Bogor model checker, and Anquiro is able to find anetworkconfigurationinwhichadisseminationprotocoldoes not reach all nodes.
Other approaches. Insense (Sharma et al., 2009 ) designs a novel language for programming wireless sensor networks applications, which then compiles into Contiki C source code. With the aim of simplifying the complexity of both programming and the verification of the resulted programs, the language hides from the programmer all language constructs regarding concurrency (e.g., for the various existing WSN-programming API: processes, threads, asynchronous events) and thread synchronization. An Insense application is instead programmed as a set of components, sharing no states and communicating through typed, synchronous channels. Selected hardware is modelled (similarly to our (Bucur and Kwiatkowska, 2009)) as Insense components and matching channels. For the purpose of verification, the components and channels are translated into Promela and model checked against LTL properties by SPIN (Holzmann, 2003) ; their cases are limited to the verification of properties of single channel operations in their translation from Insense to SPIN, such as "A send operation does not return until data has been written to a receiver's buffer".
FSMGen (Kothari et al., 2008) takes another approach to error detection in TinyOS programs: it statically analyzes the program and derives automatically a finite-state machine to describe the high-level application logic, thus aiding the programmer's understanding of the application code. The method is thoroughly applied over the demo applications available with TinyOS.
Conclusions
We have contributed a tool 10 and novel approach towards the static software verification of embedded C sensor applications. Operating-system-wide sensor programs with an added explicit emulation of hardware interrupts are automatically given precise standard C models for the MCU's direct memory access, and are then minimized in state space with the aid of a partialorder reduction technique. Safety specifications written asa ssertions and bounds for the program loops are inputted together with the program into CBMC, which is then able to verify the program and report error traces. While no new bugs have been found, we were able to reproduce known bugs in a TinyOS driver, and we list as our main achievement the efficient, fully automatic method and tool bridging embedded C compilers for sensor platforms with the state of the art tools in C software verification. 
